The Last Will Be the First. A Study of European Issue Publics on Twitter by Ruiz-Soler, Javier
                                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PACO, ISSN: 2035-6609 - Copyright © 2018 - University of Salento, SIBA: http://siba-ese.unisalento.it 
 
 
 
PArtecipazione e COnflitto 
* The Open Journal of Sociopolitical Studies 
http://siba-ese.unisalento.it/index.php/paco   
ISSN: 1972-7623 (print version) 
ISSN: 2035-6609 (electronic version) 
PACO, Issue 11(2) 2018: 423-447 
DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v11i2p423 
 
Published in July 15, 2018 
Work licensed under a Creative Commons At-
tribution-Non commercial-Share alike 3.0 
Italian License  
RESEARCH ARTICLE 
 
THE LAST WILL BE THE FIRST  
A study of European Issue Publics on Twitter 
 
 
Javier Ruiz-Soler  
European University Institute 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT: This article analyzes topics of European relevance on Twitter. It does so by examining 
#schengen and #ttip Twitter hashtags as a case study. The purpose of this article is to detect which ac-
counts are most important in terms of the number of ties received, and whether they are elite or non-elite 
actors. This is done by calculating the in-degree and out-degree scores of nodes involved in the networks 
generated by the usage of the two hashtags. The research reveals that it is easier for civil society and citi-
zens to enjoy an important level of attention similar to that of the media, institutions and politicians on 
topics of European relevance. The outcomes of this research are important when it comes to understand-
ing how a digital platform such as Twitter contributes to bottom-up conversations about relevant Europe-
an topics. What we learn here about the structure and configuration of these networks helps us obtaining 
a more fine-grained understanding of new forms of communication and interaction used by citizens, and 
their implications for the emergence of a European Public Sphere. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Internet and more specifically social media have become a space where citizens, 
activists, politicians, news organizations and institutions from across the globe can 
communicate and engage in dialogue about issues that interest them. The Internet of-
fers virtually unlimited platforms, sources of information and network opportunities. 
Different theories have emerged that try to explain this new relationship between the 
actors present in the public sphere (Benkler 2006; Bennett and Segerberg 2013; 
Chadwick 2013). These theories argue that digital media technologies such as social 
media have the potential to constitute bottom-up and grounded public spheres as they 
are less dominated by mass media and institutions, and citizens’ involvement in public 
debate becomes more spontaneous than ever before. The capability to overcome the 
domination of political and media actors of traditional communication flows is due to 
the capacity of digital platforms to transmit information and to enable public input, 
thus facilitating greater citizen and civil society engagement. 
Amongst all the digital communication tools we can find online, Twitter has received 
particular attention because of the specific characteristics of its networks. A microblog 
such as Twitter is considered the ultimate expression of online asymmetric interaction 
based on the exchange of user-generated content. Despite the extensive results of re-
search conducted on Twitter in different countries and on different topics, very little 
research is focused on the European context. The European angle remains relatively 
uncharted, and this omission is problematic especially given the increasing gap be-
tween European institutions and citizens (Morganti and Bekemans 2012). 
In this article, I research political European issue publics that can be found inside the 
European political Twittersphere in order to see whether more grassroots and less elite 
actors, which differ from political ones and the mass media, have space and visibility 
within conversations that unfold online. The purpose is to discover whether Twitter 
networks of European topics contribute to bottom-up conversations where non-elite 
individuals interact and are fully engaged. 
The article is divided into two parts. In the first part, I present network public theo-
ries and why previous research has chosen Twitter as the platform to test these theo-
ries. The article continues with the current debate on European topics online and their 
contribution to a European Public Sphere. I then introduce the research questions on 
the European context and the case study on which empirical analysis is based - two dif-
ferent hashtags on European topics – i.e., #schengen and #ttip. In the second part, I in-
troduce the data and the analytical methods adopted, followed by the illustration of 
results. I conclude by discussing the results of the analysis in relation to three aspects. 
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First, I comment on European issue publics on Twitter. Second, I compare results ob-
tained from the analysis of the two hashtags. Finally, I discuss results in relation to their 
importance for a more general discussion on the European Public Sphere. 
 
 
2. Issue publics from bottom-up 
 
In the last decade, we have seen the emergence of different theories about the 
changing roles of actors as well as on the impacts of new technologies that have 
emerged onto the public sphere. These theories have two points in common. First, 
they argue that Internet technologies have opened up new and previously unimagina-
ble possibilities of communication thanks to the usability, interoperability of digital 
communication tools and the possibility to produce and circulate user-generated con-
tent. Second, because of these opportunities, different types of actors have more visi-
bility and importance in new digital channels than in the past (Benkler 2006; Bennett 
and Segerberg 2013; Chadwick 2013).  
Benkler (2006) was one of the first to capture this change in the public sphere. He 
theorizes that contrary to the “classic” public sphere, dominated by the mass media 
and political institutions, an “online networked public sphere” provides room for other 
actors, including NGOs, think tanks, and single individuals to express and take part in 
the discussion. Benkler argues that the decentralised individual action facilitated by 
digital tools allows a more democratic and participatory form of political communica-
tion than before. Thus, the structure of the online networked public spheres is unique 
insofar as pieces of information are pushed and pulled between shared spaces and may 
travel “upward” from smaller to larger publics. In essence, networked platforms allow 
anyone to be a media outlet (boyd 2011). 
Since Benkler’s initial elaboration, the networked public sphere theory has evolved, 
particularly as a consequence of the diffusion of social media and other digital commu-
nication tools. Furthermore, other theories have been developed, complementing the 
explanation of the distinct roles played by mass media, politicians and civil society in 
these new forms of online communication. Bennet and Segerberg (2013) have shown 
that established actors are still central to political debates, but that less conventional 
voices can now also make themselves heard and sometimes heavily interact with tradi-
tional centers of attention. As online content can be posted quite easily without the in-
terference from gate-keeping journalists, it is more difficult for authorities to contain 
the free expression of citizens’ opinions and needs. All this can “empower” those who 
have always wanted to engage in public debate but were previously marginalized par-
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ticularly by traditional media thus yielding to the consolidation of a connective action 
logic underneath online interactions (Bennett and Segerberg 2013). This distributive 
connective action forms a complex and powerful alternative public sphere that serves 
as an arena for communicating, organizing and connecting a wide range of actors and 
organizations. These collectives can vary greatly in focus, scope and stability and range 
from publics emerging around specific events (Ausserhofer and Maireder 2013), politi-
cal developments (Tumasjan et al. 2010) and fan communities (Larsson and Moe 2012). 
While the Internet offers manifold communication tools, Twitter has often been 
considered the ultimate expression of online interaction based on the exchange of us-
er-generated content (Bruns and Burgess 2015). With its unique interaction system, 
Twitter is a perfect platform to study a characteristic sociotechnical type of networked 
public (Bossetta 2018). First, interactions made by users under a hashtag shape Twitter 
networks as issue publics that entertain conversations and ground communities 
(Gruzd, Wellman, and Takhteyev 2011). Moreover, these hashtagged conversations 
themselves form networks of topics or sphericules (Bruns and Highfield 2016). At the 
intersections between topics, hashtags and networks of topics a Twittersphere is 
formed. Twitterspheres can emerge in relation to the most disparate topics, from cook-
ing, to fashion, to politics. When it comes to the discussion of European topics, such as 
Brexit, Schengen, the European Elections or the European Commission, a European po-
litical Twittersphere emerges that gathers Twitter users and their interaction habits 
around topics of European relevance. Second, the inherent structure of Twitter is 
unique compared to other social media platforms, with its asymmetric principle of “fol-
lowing” users without mandatory reciprocity (Golder and Macy 2015). Third, the de-
gree of transnationalization of Twitter communications and the open interactivity 
among its users make the platform an ideal public arena with, in principle, no re-
strictions (Dutceac, Bossetta, and Trenz 2016). 
Nevertheless, despite the potential for allowing the participation of individual users 
and alternative voices, concerns have arisen about the impact of automated accounts, 
especially on Twitter. Bots are small computer programs with increasingly complex and 
sophisticated algorithms that automatically perform tasks such as the publication of 
tweets, replies and following other accounts. They can influence the dissemination of 
information, or the interruption of online conversations (Michael 2017; Howard, 
Kollanyi, and Woolley 2016). There are numerous scientific studies that point in this di-
rection and not only try to measure the quantity of bots on Twitter (Wojcik et al. 2018; 
Moon 2017), but also their impact. For instance, a research on how social media are 
used to give voice to actors traditionally excluded from public discussions raised some 
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concerns about how political bots are negatively affecting democracy and political 
communication (Tucker et al. 2017). 
 
 
3. The debate of European topics on Twitter 
 
Many scholars and political actors have insisted on the importance of a European 
Public Sphere as a contribution to the democratic quality of the European Union (Risse 
2015; Bennett, Lang, and Seberberg 2015). One of the reasons underpinning the pro-
verbial distance between European Union institutions and European citizens has been 
attributed to a communication gap: the lack of a common and public space where the 
European demos is able to talk about common concerns regarding European affairs 
(Splichal 2006; Sicakkan 2016; Kaitatzi-Whitlock 2007). 
There is no agreement as to whether the European Public Sphere exists or not (Trenz 
and Michailidou 2014; Risse 2015; Koopmans and Statham 2010). Extant studies have 
adopted different research designs to explore the domain of European political com-
munication thus revealing the sophistication and complexity of such research task. De-
spite the uneven and fragmented character of research in this area, observers consist-
ently underline that the inclusive participation of citizens in European affairs is the only 
way to generate a genuine European Public Sphere. In this respect, it has been argued 
that interaction within Europe-related debates enables lay citizens to discuss and en-
gage with European issues of common concern.  
With the diffusion of the Internet, researchers have also begun to investigate 
whether online there is already a different, more participated, interaction in public dis-
cussions than in the past (Gil De Zuñiga, Puig-I-Abril, and Rojas 2009). Increasing atten-
tion is thus being paid to the opportunities generated by the Internet enabling political 
organizations to engage with the public (Anduiza Perea 2012). Results produced in this 
respect suggest that the Internet, and the communication tools citizens and users have 
within their reach, can help increase or enhance interactions on European issues that 
are relevant for everybody (Bennett 2012). 
For the purpose of this article, I consider Twitter, as a platform where citizens can in-
form themselves about EU issues and communicate about them in a participatory way. 
For this reason, I investigate empirically whether online conversations on European is-
sues are still dominated by elite actors, such as mass media and political institutions, or 
whether other actors have a greater presence and prominence. Indeed, the extent to 
which online discussions on EU topics host different actors that acquire different levels 
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of prominence is important for the European project as well as for the consolidation of 
a more democratic and participated public sphere. 
The choice of studying Twitter as a platform where political interactions can develop 
lays in the path marked by a vast amount of research that has been carried out within 
different disciplines. One growing field of study is the study of communities and topics 
of discussion inside Twitter. For instance, Bruns and Burgess have mapped and ex-
plored Twitter networks of different Australian national elections (#ausvotes) (Bruns 
and Burgess 2011). Mappings of specific Twitter communities discussing specific topics, 
such as the Digital Humanities research community, have also been conducted 
(Grandjean and Mauro 2016). In the U.S., similar studies have been carried out explor-
ing #sopa and #pipa topic networks (Benkler et al. 2015). Furthermore, the Russian 
Twittersphere has also been a target of analysis (Kelly et al. 2012). Indeed, different ac-
ademic disciplines have explored Twitter in order to shed light on the potential of 
these networks to overcome the traditional structure of political conversations (Bruns, 
Burgess, and Highfield 2014; González-Bailón 2014; Grandjean and Mauro 2016; 
Mejova, Macy, and Weber 2015; Weller et al. 2013). As it has been shown, indeed, 
Twitter networks can be inclusive of multiple publics and connect seemingly disparate 
actors in a political debate (Ausserhofer and Maireder 2013).  
However, there is a striking shortage of empirical studies addressing the European 
level and context. Twitter-based studies considering Europe have been conducted but 
only at the national levels or with reference to specific national topics. For instance, 
observers have engaged in studying the Austrian Twitter public sphere (Ausserhofer 
and Maireder 2013), or the German discussion of #aufschrei (outcry) (Maireder and 
Schlögl 2014) and the Norwegian Twittersphere (Bruns and Enli 2018). Conversely, only 
few studies have addressed questions of the European Twittersphere transcending 
from the national lens. Exceptions in this respect are provided by the study of Twitter 
follower/followee networks of the 2014 European Elections (Maireder et al. 2014), or 
of how the circulation fo the hashtag #austerity makes national public spheres Europe-
anized (Hänska and Bauchowitz 2018; Barisione and Ceron 2017). However, compared 
to other regions, or even topics, very little research has been conducted in Europe. 
Against this background, the question on whether the European Political Twit-
tersphere is more open to the meaningful participation of non-elite, civil society and 
individual users remains an open one. With the aim of contributing to overcome this 
situation, this article will explore whether Twitter enables the creation of a bottom-up 
networked public sphere when it comes to the discussion of European political issues, 
enhancing visibility of non-elite actors. To this aim, I implement and adjust the meth-
odology already used in previous research on Twitter issue publics to study the Euro-
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pean context making a systematic use of network analysis to trace online conversations 
around European topics. Given the relative scarcity of similar analyses, I take an ex-
plorative approach and examine Twitter networks on European political topics with the 
aim of highlighting who are the actors that occupy more central positions within online 
discussions and to elaborate on the participatory nature of the European political Twit-
tersphere. 
 
 
4. #Schengen and #TTIP: two cases of European issue publics on Twitter 
 
In order to answer my research question, two issue publics have been selected that 
develop around two Twitter hashtags referring to the European context. First, the 
hashtag #schengen, which relates to the Schengen agreement, a treaty that led to the 
creation of Europe's internal borderless space, the Schengen Area, thus allowing citi-
zens to cross borders without checkpoints (European Commission 2016). Second, the 
hashtag #ttip, which refers to the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership be-
tween the European Union and the United States of America (European Commission 
2017a). Since TTIP negotiations started in 2013, the trade agreement has had alternate 
stages of advancement and stagnation until the election of Donald Trump when it was 
discarded altogether. Before that moment, the TTIP has been highly contested in na-
tional and European campaigns (Caiani and Graziano 2018).  
These hashtags were selected because they are of European relevance and used in 
different countries. On the one hand, both have European relevance because issues 
such as mobility within the EU space or trade agreements not only affect their daily 
lives, but also because they are regulated at the European level and need to be then 
implemented at the national level. Second, the two hashtags are used in different 
countries by different national publics at the same time. Moreover, the two hashtags 
can also be used by institutions, organizations or politicians, and are not officially 
backed or sponsored, as it happens in the case for other hashtags such as #Eurovision 
for the Eurovision Song Contest, or #ep2019 for the European Elections in 2019. In this 
sense, they are used by any organization, institution or individual willing to refer her 
tweets to the specific topic, sometimes together with other hashtags such as #stopttip. 
Moreover, the inclusion of both hashtags in the analysis allows for comparison.  In-
deed, online conversations around hashtags #schengen and #ttip may have fundamen-
tal differences since one unfolds around a political issue (Schengen), and the other 
around a topic of a more economic nature (TTIP). Thus, it becomes interesting to com-
pare the way in which the two issue publics are developed and organized around two 
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completely different topics that are nonetheless of European nature, to see whether 
any common patterns or relevant differences emerge. 
 
 
5. Data and Methodology 
 
To collect data necessary to trace online conversations around the two hashtags I 
used Twitter’s Streaming API (Application Programming Interface) and the software 
TCAT (Twitter Capture and Analysis Toolkit) (Borra and Rieder 2014). Collected data 
cover a period that goes from August 2016 to the end of April 2017. During this period, 
all Tweets containing “Schengen” and “TTIP” were collected regardless of the language 
in which they were written.1  
From all collected tweets, those published within three time snapshots, August 
2016, December 2016, and April 2017 were extracted. The three months were chosen 
so to leave a three-month period between one snapshot and another and to make it 
possible to compare conversations developing in “random” periods separated by regu-
lar intervals. Overall, I created three different datasets for #schengen, and three differ-
ent datasets for #TTIP. Table 1 presents the data samples and contains the total num-
ber of Tweets in each period, and the distinct active users that tweeted using one of 
the two hashtags. 
 
Table 1. Characteristics of the two Issue publics of European relevance developed around #schengen and #ttip 
Hashtag 1 August 
to 31   August 
 
1 December to 31   
December 
1 April 
to 30 April 
 Tweets 
 
Users Tweets Users Tweets Users 
#schengen 17,869 12,862 65,237 37,385 27,941 18,371 
#ttip 151,715 69,389 32,773 17,359 17,163 9,514 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
Several types of networks can be built from Twitter data. For the purpose of this in-
vestigation, I created networks consisting of mentions and retweets because the struc-
ture of this specific kind of network is indicative of actual interactions users have 
amongst them. Thus, if one user mentions or retweets another user by their username, 
 
1
 An estimation of the amount of non-captured Tweets due to the reach of rate limit imposed by the Twit-
ter API shows that during the period of data gathering, some Tweets were missing. However, the number 
of missed Tweets only accounts for around 1% of the total. 
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including retweets (RT), a directed link is created. The more often one user mentions 
another, the stronger the link between them. 
Table 2 presents the number of nodes (Twitter users) and edges (mentions to others 
and retweets) that constitute each network. It is worth noticing that the number of us-
ers in Table 1 and the number of nodes in Table 2 is not the same. The difference be-
tween these numbers corresponds to the users who tweeted using any of the two 
hashtags, yet without mentioning or retweeting any other user. Given that the focus of 
this article is on interactions, these isolated Twitter accounts were eliminated from the 
network. 
 
Table 2. Network characteristics 
Hashtag 1 August 
to 31   August 
 
1 December to 31   
December 
1 April 
to 30 April 
 Nodes 
 
Edges Nodes Edges Nodes Edges 
#schengen 12,079 17,487 36,762 67,556 18,644 28,864 
#ttip 60,663 135,142 18,413 31,094 10,120 19,614 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
Indegree centrality 
 
In order to shed light on the numbers of retweets and mentions received by users 
participating in the conversations around the two hashtags, I calculated indegree cen-
trality, which stands for the number of incoming ties held by every node in a network 
(Prell 2012). Ultimately, indegree centrality indicates how “important” a Twitter user is 
for others in the network.2 
After calculating indegree centrality for all nodes in the two conversations around 
#schengen and #ttip hashtags, I focused on the first 200 for each snapshot, i.e., those 
most mentioned and/or retweeted, to study more in details who are the actors that 
participants in our networks recognized as more important or worth retweeting. In-
deed, after the first 200 nodes, the differences in the indegree score of nodes in our 
networks is minimal. Therefore, by looking at the first 200 nodes ranked by indegree I 
 
2
 Six tables have been created for each dataset with the two hashtags containing the first 200 nodes in 
each snapshot ranked by in-degree.  They include an anonymized ID code, indegree and outdegree score, 
as well as the probability score of the account being a bot. Tables are available in an online repository at 
the following URL http:// www.github.com/jaruizso. 
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was able to capture those that were recognized by others in the network as important, 
influencers or role players. 
 
Outdegree centrality 
 
The study of indegree centrality was then complemented by that of outdegree cen-
trality. This latter calculates the outgoing ties of a node. In the context of the Twitter 
networks around #schengen and #ttip, outdegree stands for the number of retweets 
and mentions sent to other users. Thus, outdegree centrality indicates how active a 
Twitter user is in establishing ties with others in the network. Considering outdegree 
scores, I was able to see whether nodes receiving more ties from others (i.e., nodes 
with higher in-degree) are also active within the conversations or merely passive ac-
counts with very little interaction with the rest of participants.  
 
Type of actor 
 
In order to verify whether Twitter users with highest in-degree are politicians, insti-
tutions, mass media or civil society and individual citizens, most prominent nodes in 
were classified into different groups. By looking at the results of this classification, I 
could elaborate on whether Twitter allows individual users and civil society to by-pass 
the dominance of institutions and mass media as rulers of online debates and influenc-
ers.  
Although there have been various attempts to classify Twitter accounts into differ-
ent actor types (see for instance Dutceac Segesten and Bossetta 2016; Lotan et al. 
2011; Pavan 2017; Barisione, Michailidou, and Airoldi 2017), for the purpose of this ar-
ticle I chose to manually classify users in four groups based on the description field of 
their Twitter account. If the account represents a local, regional, national, international 
or transnational public office, political party, politician, or political institution, it is cod-
ed as Group 1. If the account is from media industry or journalists, it is coded as Group 
2. If the account is from a think tank, NGO, association, company or social movement, 
it is coded as Group 3. Finally, if the account description points towards an independ-
ent blogger or account without any kind of manifest affiliation, it is coded as Group 4. 
Table 3 presents the results of this grouping. Groups 1 and 2 represent actors who tra-
ditionally play a leading role and exerted power in the public sphere: politicians, politi-
cal institutions and mass media. Groups 3 and 4 represent instead actors with a sec-
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ondary role or mere listeners. Following Andrew Chadwick’s approach, Groups 1 and 2 
gather elite actors, while groups 3 and 4 hold together non-elite actors.3 
Table 3. Categorization scheme to distinguish types of most central actors 
Group Nature 
 
Description 
1 Politician, politics - National politician or political institution, EU politician or institution, 
public office, political party, etc. 
2 Media & 
Communications 
- Media industry, newspapers, professionals in journalism and/or 
communications related, news source etc. 
3 Civil society - NGOs, think tanks, associations, companies, celebrities etc. 
4 Citizen - Individual user level, including independent bloggers, experts, etc. 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
Bots 
 
Once that network nodes have been ranked by in-degree, and the first 200 accounts 
have been categorized by actor group, I verified whether these Twitter accounts were 
“real” accounts managed by humans or bots. The identification of bots is pursued to 
analyze whether the European context shows similarities or differences in terms of 
quantity and impacts of automated accounts with cases dealt within previous research 
on different regions or topics. A higher number of “non-real” accounts amongst the 
most mentioned ones would thus point towards a successful manipulation of the con-
versation. 
To spot bots, I used the BotOrNot API developed by the Observatory on Social Media 
from Indiana University (Davis et al. 2016). The algorithm calculates a score that ranges 
from 0 to 100 for each account that is based on different indicators – particularly, the 
number of tweets, the date of the last tweet, ratio of followers, etc. The higher the 
score, the higher the probability that an account is a bot. This scoring method is not 
perfect, but it is an effective way to determine whether or not a given user account is 
likely to be fraudulent. For the purpose of this article, I consider account scoring over 
65% as having a high probability of being a bot. 
 
 
 
 
3
 With regard to Group 3 and Group 4, it is worth specifying the reasons why I decided to keep them sepa-
rated even if citizens and individual users are part of civil society. In light of recent reflections on the re-
trenched role of formal organizations for political participation processes (e.g., Earl and Kimport 2011), I 
decided to keep them separated to identify more accurately the nature of individual users, and their pos-
sible influence as solo Twitter accounts. 
Partecipazione e conflitto, 11(2) 2018: 423-447, DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v11i2p423 
  
434 
 
6. Results 
 
Tables 4 and 5 introduce the results for the classification of the most mentioned and 
retweeted accounts for both hashtags. The first row in each table reports the overall 
number of Twitter accounts per group, while the second row shows the sum per elite 
actors (Groups 1 and 2) versus non-elite actors (Groups 3 and 4). To enable compari-
son, the third row shows the percentage for each of the four groups and, in the fourth 
row, the percentage of elite actors and non-elite actors is given. Finally, the last row in 
the tables shows the number of potential bots. 
In Table 4, for the #schengen hashtag, we observe that non-elite actors (Groups 3 
and 4) represent most of most mentioned and retweeted accounts. Within each snap-
shot, their percentage goes from 53.5% in the network for April 2017 to the 57.5% for 
August 2016. Moreover, thirteen bots were identified for #schengen. Figure 1 gives us 
the aggregate number of accounts for the three periods. As it shows, 345 accounts 
over the 600 most mentioned and retweeted (57.5%) are non-elite actors. 
 
Table 4. Categorization of most central nodes for #schengen 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Total 
August 2016 
Number of Twitter accounts 50 35 18 97 200 
Elite vs. non-elite actors 85 115 200 
Percentage 25% 17.5% 9% 48.5% 100% 
Percentage elite vs. non-elite actors 42.5% 57.5% 100% 
Bots 3 (1.5%) - 
December 2016 
Number of Twitter accounts 42 35 12 111 200 
Classic vs. new actors 77 123 200 
Percentage 21% 17.5% 6% 55.5% 100% 
Percentage elite vs. non-elite actors 38.5% 61.5% 100% 
Bots 6(3%) - 
August 2017 
Number of Twitter accounts 51 42 20 87 200 
Amount of elite vs non-elite actors 93 107 200 
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Percentage 25.5% 21% 10% 43.5% 100% 
Percentage elite vs. non-elite actors 46.5% 53.5% 100% 
Bots 4(2%) - 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
 
Figure 1. Elite actors vs. non-elite actors for #schengen (N=600)  
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
In Table 5, for the #TTIP hashtag, results are similar to those for #schengen: there is 
a majority of non-elite actors in the three time periods as they range from 50.5% in Au-
gust 2016 to 64.5% in April 2017. However, the number of potential bots is lower than 
that in the #schengen network as only five accounts were classified as bots. In Figure 2, 
the aggregate number of accounts in the two elite and non-elite categories shows that 
in the #ttip conversation there is a slightly higher number of accounts classified as non-
elite actors (60%) compared to #schengen. Across the three periods, indeed, a total of 
358 out of 600 are non-elite actors. 
In order to verify that these results do not respond to the structural configuration of 
the network, a random sample for each dataset was taken and analysed.4 This random 
sample verifies that the results in Tables 4 and 5 correspond to bottom-up interactions 
and not to the proportional configuration of the respective network. In this case, a 
random selection of 200 nodes for each hashtag was taken, and then classified by actor 
 
4
 An additional robustness check was performed by calculating the mean of indegree scores plus a stand-
ard deviation. With mean of indegree plus a standard deviation threshold, the percentage results are very 
similar to the distribution by group of the random sample.  
Non-Elite 
Actors 
57.5% 
Elite 
Actors 
42.5% 
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type following the same manual coding as for the first 200 with highest in-degree 
score. 
Table 6 presents the results of the classification of nodes in the random sample for 
each hashtag. As it shows, results are very similar for both hashtags, with over 87% 
(175 accounts out of 200) representing Group 4, i.e., individual accounts. In addition, 
the number of potential bots increases to 9.5% for #schengen and to 10.5% for #ttip, 
with 19 and 23 accounts respectively.  
Table 5. Categorization of most central nodes for #ttip 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Total 
August 2016      
Number of Twitter Accounts 44 55 44 57 200 
Elite vs. non-elite actors 99 101 200 
Percentage 22% 27.5% 22% 28.5% 100% 
Percentage elite vs. non-elite actors 49.5% 50.5% 100% 
Bots 2(1%) - 
December 2016 
Number of Twitter accounts 52 20 47 81 200 
Classic vs. new actors 72 128 200 
Percentage 26% 10% 23.5% 40.5% 100% 
Percentage elite vs.non-elite actors 36% 64% 100% 
Bots 1(0.5%) - 
April 2017 
Number of Twitter accounts 45 26 58 71 200 
Elite vs non-elite actors 71 129 200 
Percentage 22.5% 13% 29% 35.5% 100% 
Percentage elite vs. non-elite actors 35.5% 64.5% 100% 
Bots 2(1%) - 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
What is captured by the random samples confirms that the results in Tables 4 and 5 
are genuine and valid. The random samples reveal the natural distribution by groups of 
the entire network, with Group 4 being the largest. If the results in the random sample 
were similar to those in Tables 4 and 5, it would mean that the random sample and the 
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in-degree ranking merely replicate the configuration of the networks. However, this is 
not the case. Therefore, results reflect the actual interaction of accounts based on dis-
cretional choices of participants about who are the accounts that are considered more 
important or worth mentioning. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Elite actors vs. non-elite actors for #ttip (N=600) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
Table 6. Summary of accounts belonging to type of actor for random samples 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Total 
Sc
h
e
n
ge
n
 
Number of Twitter accounts 8 7 8 177 200 
Elite va. non-elite actors 15 185 200 
Percentage 4% 3.5% 4% 88.5% 100% 
Percentage elite vs. non-Elite 7.5% 92.5% 100% 
Bots 19(9.5%) - 
TT
IP
 
Number of Twitter accounts 9 7 10 174 200 
Classic vs. new actors 16 184 200 
Percentage 4.5% 3.5% 5% 87% 100% 
Percentage elite vs. non-elite 8% 92% 100% 
Bots 23(10.5%) - 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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Figure 3 summarizes the overall indegree and outdegree scores for elite and non-
elite accounts in the three snapshots considered for both hashtags. The overall score 
was obtained by summing up the total number of ties received by each elite or non-
elite group. As it shows, non-elite actors receive a greater amount of attention in the 
#ttip conversation, while elite actors are more prominent in the #schengen one. More-
over, in both cases, the most mentioned and retweeted accounts are not very active, 
as shown by the overall outdegree scores. In general, therefore, these results suggest 
that most influential actors barely interacted with others in the network. Also, in both 
cases, accounts that have higher out-degree scores, that is, nodes that start more in-
teractions, are from Groups 3 and 4 – hence, from the civil society, including individual 
citizens. Nonetheless, their out-degree score is very low compared to their in-degree 
score. 
 
Figure 3. Volume of Tweets and Retweets for #schengen and #ttip 
  
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
 
7. Discussion 
 
The calculated metrics and classification of accounts by actor groups presented 
above allow us to reconstruct the #schengen and #ttip issue publics on Twitter and, in 
this way, to elaborate on the type of interactions that users develop on Twitter while 
discussing European topics. In what follows, I read the results illustrated in the previous 
section to shed light on three different and yet interrelated aspects. First, I comment 
on European issue publics on Twitter. Second, I compare results obtained from the 
analysis of #schengen and #ttip. Finally, I discuss results in relation to their importance 
for a more general discussion on the European public sphere. 
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In response to the research question in this empirical study, the #schengen and #ttip 
Twitter networks do in fact enhance the visibility of actors who have traditionally been 
listeners. The in-degree metric calculated suggest a de-hierarchization of traditional 
gatekeepers, opening up opportunities for non-elite actors to have more visibility, and 
to play a key role in spreading information on European issues. The results are in line 
with what has already been observed in similar researches that, based on the categori-
zation of accounts within online networks, showed the high presence of non-elite ac-
tors (Bennett, Lang, and Segerberg 2015; Bruns and Enli 2018; Benkler et al. 2015; 
Maireder and Schlögl 2014). Thus, results show that non-elite actors obtain attention 
and can become part of the set of actors that are taken as preferred interlocutors by 
participants in all six snapshots for both hashtags. Ultimately, non-elite actors, espe-
cially independent citizens, or individual accounts without any type of affiliation are 
mentioned and retweeted often and thus become alternative voices to those of tradi-
tional political and media actors. 
In terms of bots, the analysis has shown that very few nodes amongst the most cen-
tral ones were “non-real”. However, the number of bots in the random samples is simi-
lar to that identified in previous Twitter research – which is roughly around 12% 
(Martinez 2017). This result has two implications. First, when it comes to the discussion 
of the two European issues, interactions tend to occur between “real people” than 
with automated accounts, despite these latter are often very effective in capturing at-
tention and numbers of retweets (Michael 2017; Badawy, Ferrara, and Lerman 2018). 
Second, the lower attention given to bots shows that, in both cases, online issue pub-
lics have not been manipulated artificially. Although the number of bots in the entire 
networks was similar to that emerged in the study of other Twitter networks, auto-
mated accounts did not receive any particular attention in the discussion of examined 
European topics and, therefore, did not have a significant impact in terms of visibility 
and the spread of information. 
The comparison between networks linked to the two hashtags reveals two main dif-
ferences. The first relates to the size of the datasets (see Table 1). The size of the da-
taset for #ttip is 55% larger than that for #schengen. There are no technical explana-
tions, for instance, limits on Twitter rates, that could explain the difference. It is simply 
that users employed the hashtag #ttip more frequently during the period of data col-
lection. One of the reasons behind higher levels of discussion on TTIP is the declara-
tions made by German official Sigmar Gabriel, Minister of Economic Affairs and Energy 
and Deputy to Chancellor Angela Merkel, about the failure of US–EU talks regarding 
the Treaty in August 2016 (Ford 2016; Guida 2016). However, both datasets are smaller 
in comparison to those designed starting from other hashtags or topics (Hänska and 
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Bauchowitz 2016; Whitehead 2015; Theocharis et al. 2015), indicating that European 
topics are not particularly interesting or popular across the European Twitter commu-
nity. 
A second difference can be observed for the total number of ties received by elite 
actors for #schengen. As shown above, while for both #schengen and #ttip non-elite 
actors are keener to interact with others, only in the discussion about the TTIP treaty 
they also managed to become a greater catalyzer of attention. Conversely, elite actors 
obtained more attention in the discussion about the Schengen treaty. One motivation 
behind this result is the highly contested nature of the TTIP treaty, which stimulated 
several bottom-up and civil society protest campaigns across Europe (Caiani and 
Graziano 2018), whereas the topics associated with #schengen are typically more dis-
cussed by politicians and institutions. 
The results of the so-called European political Twittersphere go hand in hand with 
those produced by similar research conducted in other regions or countries and on 
other topics. Indeed, there is no remarkable difference with previous research and the 
results for the “European context”: within Twitter networks, non-elite actors can enjoy 
higher visibility that in other contexts and thus have a greater chance of being seen and 
heard. 
Ultimately, results of empirical analysis suggest that Twitter has indeed the potential 
to boost European conversations between different national bubbles, acting as a 
bridge between different national spheres and allowing the participation of individual 
and organizational actors who did not previously have a place in which they could be 
sufficiently visible. In this way, European citizens can discuss European issues of com-
mon concern and can also affect the contents that are associated with these issues, 
without being particularly manipulated (see the rather low presence of bots amongst 
most mentioned and retweeted accounts). 
Nevertheless, the small size of the datasets compared to other hashtags previously 
researched indicates that political topics of European relevance lack in popularity and 
interest. This is correlated with Eurobarometer’s findings and the lack of interest in Eu-
ropean politics in general (European Commission 2013, 2017b). This is not the case for 
European topics that are not political, such as Eurovision.5 The lack of interest on politi-
cal issues may constitute a barrier to boosting a European dialogue, or engaging citi-
zens in European politics. In spite of the scant interest that there may be for European 
issues, our networks suggest also a certain degree of cohesion in online discussions 
around these topics. For both hashtags, very few Tweets become invisible since at least 
 
5
 On the day of the final in 2018 during my own data collection of Tweets using #eurovision hashtag, I 
gathered over 3 million Tweets. 
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91% of the collected tweets contain either a mention or a retweet. Albeit of smaller 
scale than in other cases, issue publics forming around European issues are formed by 
a niche of interested and interaction-prone users. 
 
 
 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
In this article, I presented a number of insights concerning how the hashtags 
#schengen and #ttip on Twitter developed in specific periods of time. The main objec-
tive was to empirically explore the theories of bottom-up networked publics in a Euro-
pean context. I considered Twitter as a digital platform where users can interact direct-
ly and override media and politicians/political institutions. I applied in-degree centrality 
in order to highlight which actors are getting more mentions and retweets, and thus 
more attention. The manual classification of accounts with higher scores into four dif-
ferent types of actors shows that civil society and individual users (non-elite actors) can 
receive more attention than mass media, politicians and political institutions (elite ac-
tors) but that the type of issue discussed still play a role in determining the extent to 
which traditional hierarchies can be overcome.  
With its exploratory take, this study makes three main contributions. First, it adds to 
ongoing discussions on the European Public Sphere by investigating in depth part of 
the European political Twittersphere. Second, it shows how European Twitter’s issue 
publics are configured, taking #schengen and #ttip Twitter networks as a case study, 
and contrasting them with other research on Twitter issue publics. Third, it contributes 
to the study of political communication using social media and big data. In this sense, 
this research is a tentative input to emerging studies based on larger-scale on Europe-
an political communication and political participation. 
The type of analysis presented here has, however, some limitations. The datasets I 
considered here must be taken for what they are: snapshots of communication flows 
between users located specific periods of time. In this sense, results could vary de-
pending on the actual period selected. Another potential limitation pertains to the im-
possibility to unveil the role played by the internal algorithms of Twitter. Social media 
platforms are ruled by different algorithms that rank the contents that users see. Some 
have argued that these implemented algorithms produce echo chambers of interest, as 
users see more and more of what they are interested in (Dunbar et al. 2015; Gerhards 
and Schafer 2010; Papacharissi 2009). Thanks to these algorithms, popular content is 
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oftentimes emphasized, and thus a smaller number of actors are empowered, with the 
overall result that hierarchies are reinforced rather than overcome. However, the ex-
tent to which eco chambers threaten genuine debate in the public sphere remains a 
highly debated issue. Other scholars indeed stress that the multi-choice environment 
enabled by digital platforms makes it hard for users not to see information from “the 
other side” (Dubois and Blank 2018). We do not know whether the accounts receiving a 
higher number of interactions in the results of the analysis were favored by the plat-
form itself. In any case, if this promotion occurred, it gave often higher visibility to ac-
counts that were traditionally considered listeners, or which played a secondary role. 
Despite these limitations, the outcomes presented are still valid as they demonstrate 
the interaction on European topics for a concrete period of time. Further research 
could explore other topics of European relevance, and an expansion of the timespan of 
data collection may also yield different and more complete insights. In addition, analy-
sis on the types of interactions opens up a potential field of research, where interac-
tions can be examined in relation to their capacity to span across different national 
contexts, this contributing to the emergence of a transnational European Public 
Sphere, as well as with regards to their contents, in order to dissect how European citi-
zens do characterize these European topics. 
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